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I

he Mytilenean and Aeduan revolts were separated by four hundred
years and two thousand miles, but in the narratives of Thucydides
and Caesar, they bear remarkable similarities. The Aedui have been
neficiaries of unparalleled favor from Caesar and Rome, yet are enticed
by Convictolitavis and Litaviccus to join the rebellion of Vercingetorix on the
grounds that the Romans have become their oppressors rather than their allies.
In Book 3 of Thucydides, the Mytileneans revolt from Athens, although they too
have been favored allies; they claim in their entreaty to the Spartans that they are
no longer bound to the Athenians by trust, but rather by fear. After the revolts
are suppressed, both cities are spared. As I will demonstrate, the circumstances
of the revolts as presented in this narratives share more similarities than may
be attributed to mere historical coincidence. Caesar, I argue, actively evokes
the Thucydidean passage in his work. But if Caesar is intentionally recalling
the 5th century event, what is at stake in making such an allusion? What would
Caesar stand to gain from a comparison between the revolt of the Aedui and the
revolt of the Mytileneans? The answer to this is found in the response to each
revolt. By contrasting his swift suppression of the Aedui with the Athenians'
divisive and clumsy handling of the Mytileneans, Caesar demonstrates a central
principle of his approach as a commander: it is more effective to deal with a crisis
by looking to what is beneficial in the long-term than by thinking only of present
concerns.
It is now a commonplace of Caesarian scholarship to acknowledge
that Caesar's commentarii are more than bare lists of facts recorded as the raw
materials for "real" historians. 1 The conversation has evolved since publication of
Even Hirtius suspected that Caesar had set up these future authors for failure: constat
enim inter omnes nihil tam operose ab aliis esse perfectum, quad non horum elegantia commentariorum
superetur: qui sunt editi, ne scientia tantarum rerum scriptoribus deesset, adeoque probantur omnium
iudicio ut praerepta, non praebita, Jacultas scriptoribus videatur, "For everyone agrees that no work by
1

anyone was ever completed so carefully that it is not surpassed in elegance by these commentaries; commentaries which were published lest knowledge of such achievements be unavailable to
other writers, and which are appraised so highly in the opinion of all that the materials seems to
have been snatched away from, not offered to, future writers (preface, Book 8)."
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Rambaud' s groundbreaking but somewhat accusatory work, 2 but the gist is
the same: Caesar skillfully crafted the narrative of the commentarii to create
a specific image of himself as a commander. In this respect, the revolt of the
Aedui confirms what has already been demonstrated in the earlier books of
the BG: that Caesar often demonstrated dementia toward defeated enemies.3
What is far more interesting, however, is how Caesar the writer constructed
that image in the case of the Aeduan revolt; he alludes intertextually to
Thucydides's account of the Mytilenean revolt, demonstrating by contrast
the efficiency of his command. While recent studies have embraced the idea
that Caesar was a canny and creative author, scholars have not sufficiently
explored the possibility that Caesar was as capable of literary intertextuality
as, for example, the Augustan poets were.
The idea of (and indeed the very term) intertextuality continues
to be debated energetically, and so it will be useful to outline here the sort
of intertextuality in which I argue Caesar is engaged. Caesar's method of
allusion in the passages discussed here is not what Stephen Hinds (following
Conte) calls "exemplary modeling" or "modeling by particular sourcepassages."4 That is, we should not necessarily look for specific linguistic
allusions, repetitions of particular phrases, or direct correspondences
from one Thucydidean passage to one Caesarian passage. Instead, Caesar
employs Thucydides as a Contean "code model," that is, a model which
"allows the philologist to reconstruct, from analysis, a corresponding
hermeneutic model - a simulacrum of the overall sense which could
coherently represent a series of phenomena that could be otherwise
registered only piecemeal, in uncoordinated, discrete details." 5 In the
present case, we observe not an assortment of specific linguistic references to
Thucydides, but rather a more general invocation of the Thucydidean model.
Christopher Pelling has made a related argument to explain some
otherwise perplexing Thucydidean references by Appian and Cassius
Dio. 6 He rightly notes that these references by the later historians are often
awkward, ill-placed, or shallow. For example, Pelling points out Dio's
nearly compulsive repetition of the Thucydidean theme of "human nature,"
invoking To av0pw1TEtov as an explanation for a number of complaints:
for men's predilection for blustering, empty threats (38.7.2), for the rapid
shifting of political alliances (39.6.1), and for piracy (36.20.1-2). This
important Thucydidean theme seems misplaced and even trivialized in
Dio' s work.7 Dio' s point, Pelling argues, is not to imply a direct and specific
2
As articulated by Krebs 2006, 111-112: "While earlier investigations tried to prove
Caesar wrong and convict him of manipulating his readers by falsification of facts, more
recent work has focused on his artful representation and how he makes use of literary
allusions and cultural assumptions to convey his message(s)."
3
At least when it was in his own interest to do so. More on this below.
4
Hinds 1998, 41-47.
5
Conte 1986, 31.
6
Pelling 2010, 105-118.
7
Pelling 2010, 106: "None of these contexts makes points on a Thucydidean level."
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correspondence between each Thucydidean passage and his own, but
rather to evoke a "resonance" of the Thucydidean world in general: "To be
reminded of Thucydides is to be reminded of that whole hard-edged political
and military world that Thucydides described, where words were often
at odds with deeds, where decisions were so often reached on the basis of
expediency and profit but also in anger and miscalculation, where morality
suffered, and where ... stasis, civil conflict, provided the prism through
which the most brutal and unsettling aspects of warfare became particularly
visible and stark." 8 This is the same mode of intertextuality and allusion in
which I argue Caesar is engaged in the passages discussed here. Like Appian
and Cassius Dio, Caesar does not suggest a one-to-one correspondence
between Thucydides's context and his own. Rather, he invokes the
Thucydidean world as a backdrop against which his own actions will be read
more favorably. I discuss this literary method in more detail below.
This is an opportune moment for an exploration of intertextuality
in Caesar's commentarii; the present inquiry is informed by both the recent
interest in the study of intertextuality in historiography in general and by
the increasing appreciation among Latinists for Caesar as a literary artist.
Although intertextuality and allusion have long been the province of scholars
of Augustan poetry, the last decade has at last seen their arrival in studies of
ancient historiography. 9 Recent years have also seen increasing, if not quite
yet flourishing, interest in the literary qualities of Caesar's commentarii. 10
Cynthia Damon demonstrated the fruits to be gained by taking an active
approach to reading the Bellum Civile rather than inching through the text
mechanically, clause by clause, sentence by sentence. The active approach
is both challenging and rewarding, "because Caesar, writing for readers
who wanted to understand and judge recent events and the actors in them,
leaves a great deal for the responsibility of interpretation to his readers." 11
8
Pelling 2010, 107.
9
On this trend in general, see O'Gorman 2009. For recent individual studies, see
Damon 2010 on Tacitus; Meyer 2010 on Sallust and Thucydides; and Pelling 2010 on Appian, Cassius Dio, and Thucydides, as discussed above. Seminars on intertextuality and
historiography were held at the 2011 and 2013 annual meetings of the American Philological Association, as well.
10
Two wide-ranging edited volumes on the commentaries have appeared in the
last decade and a half; Anton Powell and Kathryn Welch's Julius Caesar as Artful Re-porter
(1998) offers a variety of perspectives on Caesar's literary qualities, self-presentation, and
rhetorical techniques, as does Caesar Against Liberty? Perspectives on his Autocracy (2003).
Several monographs on the commentarii have appeared in recent years, as well. On the
BG: Andrew Riggsby, Caesar in Gaul and Rome discusses Caesar's presentation of geography and ethnography, as well as Caesar's self-presentation and the nature and perception
of the commentarius as a genre. Batstone and Damon 2006 treat the BC as a literary "masterpiece," focusing on Caesar's style and structure. Most recently, Grillo 2012 examines
the underlying ideology of the BC through a study of Caesarian rhetoric and style.
Furthermore, the 2012 American Philological Association annual meeting panel "Caesar as
litterator" was a good indication of current interest in Caesar's literary qualities.
11
Damon 1993, 185.
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Damon's approach requires the reader to follow intricately woven threads, to
fill in the blanks, to read between the lines: "The other method of reading the BC
aims at fashioning a net of memory and understanding by tying the knots which
link episodes and characters that are found on the long strands of narrative." 12 The
rewards of this reader responsibility are multiplied when extended beyond the
borders of the Caesarian corpus; there is a great deal to be gained by the reader's
careful attention to narrative strands and networks within Caesar's works, and, as
I demonstrate here, even more lies in store for the reader armed with a thorough
knowledge of the literary works in which Caesar himself was steeped.
It is probable that at least some members of Caesar's Roman audience
in the 50s BCE would have recognized a Thucydidean allusion. 13 Contemporary
Romans were not only still reading Thucydides, but also engaging with him as
a rhetorical model (badly, if we believe Cicero). In the Brutus, Cicero's Atticus
cautions that Thucydidean prose is ill-suited to oratory (287-288); in the Orator,
Cicero refers derisively to imitators of Thucydides (ecce autem aliqui se Thucydidios
esse profitentur, novum quoddam imperitorum et inauditum genus, "And there are also
those who call themselves 'Thucydideans,' a new and unheard-of group of idiots,"
30). These orators who so ambitiously mimicked the style of the Greek historian
apparently did not share the judgment of the first-century literary critic Dionysius
of Halicamassus, who devoted a long treatise to criticism of Thucydides's style.14
While he does not condemn Thucydides's narrative technique wholesale,15
Dionysius is deeply critical of Thucydidean syntax and prose style:
EKOT)AOTaTa OE aVTOV Kai xapaKTTJPIKWTaTa EOTI TO TE lTEtpaoTat 01'
EAaxioTC,JV 6voµ6:Twv lTAEIOTa OT)µaiVEIV ,rp6:yµaTa Kai lTOAAa
OVVT18evat VOT)µaTa EIS EV, Kal <TO> ETI ,rpooOEXOµEv6v Tl TOW
aKpoaTf)V CXKOUE08at KaTaAEllTEIV· vqi'
TO f3paxv

WV

aoaqies yivETat

(Thuc. 24)

[Thucydides's] most conspicuous and characteristic traits are his
attempt to say the largest number of things in the fewest words and his
compression of many thoughts into one, and the fact that he leaves the
listener expecting to hear something more. By all of these things, his
12
Damon 1993, 185.
13
The question of exactly who constituted Caesar's audience is often debated; most argue that Caesar's commentaries were primarily aimed at the senate (e.g., Rambaud 1966, Meier
1995, Marincola 1997. However, Wiseman 1998 argues that Caesar intended to reach a wider
audience, which was achieved through public recitations. For the purposes of the present inquiry, I assume, obviously, that the greater part of Caesar's intended audience was literate, and
furthermore that at least some fraction was well-read enough that Caesar might reasonably
expect them to recognize an allusion to a famous episode from Thucydides.
14
See Pritchett 1975 for a useful overview and commentary on the De Thucydide. In
addition to the De Thucydide, Dionysius also composed a letter to one Ammaeus concerning
Thucydides's language.
15
TipoatpEOEWS TE Kai ovv6:µEWS, ova' EKAoy1crµ6s TWV 6:µapTT]µO:TWV ova' aAAo
El;EVTEAtcrµos ova' Tl TOlOVTOV Epyov OVOEV, EV c;:i Ta µEV KaTop8vµaTa Kai TCIS apETixS OVOEVOS
iil;iwKa Myov, To'is OE µ17 KaTix To Kpa:TtcrTov EipT]µEV01s Erncpvoµa, "The object of my work is
not an attack on the undertaking or skill of Thucydides, nor a reckoning of his mistakes, nor
a disparagement, nor any other effort of this sort, in which I placed no value on the successes
and virtues of the work and dwell on the less-than-ideal remarks ... " (3)
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brevity is rendered obscure·
For this reason, Dionysius explains, the style of Thucydides is wholly unsuitable
for oratory. 16
In addition to these explicit reflections on the rhetorical value of
Thucydides for contemporary Romans, there is ample evidence for the literary use
of Thucydides by late republican authors. Scholars have long recognized Sallust's
close appreciation for both Thucydidean style and theme. T. F. Scanlon's The
Influence of Thucydides on Sallust is a comprehensive study of parallel themes, style,
and passages; other scholarship has focused on particular Thucydidean moments
in Sallust's works.17 Initiating his historical project toward the end of Sallust's life
and career,18 Livy did not follow Sallust in adopting the confounding prose style
of Thucydides, nor his bleak worldview, but echoes of the Greek historian made
their way into his narrative nevertheless. Barbara Saylor Rodgers convincingly
argues that Livy's account of the Second Punic War is especially Thucydidean.
The Sicilian expedition, she argues, looms in the background of Livy's books 21-30;
she focuses on allusions to the speeches of Nicias and Alcibiades in the orations of
Fabius and Scipio to the senate in 205 BCE.
It is not, perhaps, too surprising to detect a bit of Thucydides in the works
of Roman historians, given the shared genre; he can also be found lurking in less
obvious places, as well. For example, Lucretius's debt to the Greek historian is
evident in his account of the plague in Book 6 of De Rerum Natura; this description
appears to have been heavily informed by Thucydides's account of the plague
at Athens. 19 The biographer Cornelius Nepos seems to have used Thucydides
as a source for his Greek lives, and specifically cites him on several occasions
(Themistocles 1.4, 9.1, 10.4; Pausanias 2.2; Alcibiades 11.1).20
The relationship between Caesar and Thucydides has not been the subject
of extensive discussion, but scholars have begun to entertain the idea. The editors
of 1998's Julius Caesar as Artful Reporter suggested an affinity of approach (if not
a specific intertextual relationship) between the two authors with their titular
allusion to Virginia Hunter's Thucydides: The Artful Reporter. John Carter, Christine
Kraus, and Anton Powell have cited several examples of apparent parallels with
Thucydides iu the BC. 21 When discussing Caesar's awareness of Thucydidean
16
Among other things, Dionysius also critiques the structure of Thucydides's work
(10.338) and the placement and organization of various speeches, including the funeral
oration (17.349-18.353).
17
See, for example, Meyer 2010 on allusions to Thucydides's "Letter of Nicias" in Sallust's "Letter of Pompey" (Histories 2.98).
18
Approximately. Following the testimony of Jerome, most scholars place Sallust's
death in 35 BCE; Syme 1964 summarizes the evidence for the date of Sallust's death. The date
of composition of the first pentad is still debated, although most agree Livy was writing or
revising these books by the early 20s BCE; see Burton 2000 and Scheidel 2009.
19
Corumager 1957.
20
For a brief summary of Nepos' use of Thucydides and relevant bibliography, see
Titchener 2003.
21
Kraus 2007 follows Carter 1991 in observing the echoes of Thucydidean naval warfare in Caesar's Massilia, and further points out similarities between the Massilians' reactions
to the battle and the Athenian response to their losses in Syracuse (BC 2.7.3 and Thucy. 8.1).
Powell 1998 notes the silnilarity of Caesar's depictions of naval warfare with Thucydides's (BC
2.4-6 and Thucy. 7.71); the similarity of their portraits of the perversion of morals in civil strife
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narrative techniques more generally, Luca Grillo observes that Caesar's method
of "inferred motivation" for purposes of characterization seems to be modeled on
Thucydides's example· 22
Although the Aeduan and Mytilenean revolts occurred four centuries
apart, under very different political circumstances in very different parts of the
world, many of the details are similar enough to provide Caesar with a suitable
framework for Thucydidean allusion. In 52 BCE, Vercingetorix of the Averni
led a loose coalition of Gallic tribes in resistance against the Romans; the Aedui
initially resisted Vercingetorix's overtures and declined to join the revolt. The
Aedui had long been allies of Rome (e.g., Jratres consanguineique, BG 1.33.2). They
were particularly indebted to Caesar, who, early in his tenure in Gaul, had come to
the aid of the Aedui against the invading Helvetii (BG 1.2-29); in the same year (58
BCE) Caesar had also intervened to defend the Aedui and Sequani from the forces
of Ariovistus the German, who threatened to drive the Gauls from their territory
(BG 1.31-53). At this point, the Aedui fade from the main narrative of the middle
books of the BG, but return to center stage in Book 7 (52 BCE). 23 At that time, Caesar
and all his resources were focused on suppressing the revolt led by Vercingetorix,
who had assembled a coalition of Gallic tribes with an eye toward driving Roman
forces out of Gaul. Initially, the Aedui resisted Vercingetorix's advances, but they
did not hold out for long. Although the Aedui had promised to aid Caesar in the
siege of Gergovia, persuaded by one Convictolitavis that the slavery or freedom
of all the Gauls hinged on their participation in the revolt, 24 the Aeduan forces
instead treacherously attacked Caesar's baggage train (BG 7.42). Although Caesar
forced the surrender of that particular band, the Aedui continued to contribute to
Vercingetorix's cause; the war was concluded and the revolt quashed with Caesar's
victory at Alesia. Considering his investment in the Aeduan state, and having
endured their internal squabbles and slipping diligence, Caesar seems to have been
particularly wounded by their participation in the rebellion. 25
(BC 3.32 and Thucy. 3.82.4); and their similar remarks on the "excessive trust in, or fear of, the
unknown" (BC 2.4.4 and Thucy. 5.103.2, 7.50.4).
22
Grillo 2011.
23
One noteworthy exception is in Book 5, when Dumnorix briefly resurfaces. Caesar,
preparing for his expedition to Britain, was uneasy at the prospect of leaving Dumnorix behind
in Gaul, given his tendency to foment strife among the Gauls. Dumnorix, however, resisted
Caesar's demand that he accompany him to Britain and was executed by the Gallic cavalry at
Caesar's command.
24
Convictolitavis had recently been confirmed in his magistracy by Caesar himself,
who had intervened in the disputed election at the request of the Aedui; Convictolitavis' sudden eagerness to revolt against Caesar may have been the result of pecuniary persuasion by the
Arverni (sollicitatus ab Arvernis pecunia, 7.37.1).
25
See, for example, 7.54 (Discedentibus his breviter sua in Aeduos merita euit, quos et quam

humiles accepisset, compulsos in oppida, multatos agris omnibus ereptis copiis, imposito stipendio,
obsidibus summa cum contumelia extortis, et quam in fortunam quamque in amplitudinem deduxisset,
ut non solum in pristinum statum redissent, sed omnium temporum dignitatem et gratiam antecessisse
viderentur, "As they are departing, he briefly [states] his services toward the Aedui: in what
state and how lowly he found them, having been driven into their towns, robbed of their land
with all their resources stripped away, a tribute imposed on them, hostages extorted from them
with the greatest insult; and to what fortune and lofty height he had raised them, such that not
only had they returned to their former position, but they seemed to have surpassed the dignity
and influence of any time in the past, ").
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The revolt of the Mytileneans during the Peloponnesian War was, like
the Aeduan revolt, timed to take advantage of an entity whose resources were
already heavily taxed. Close on the heels of the Spartan invasion of Attica in the
summer of 428 BCE, the towns of Lesbos (save Methymna) revolted from Athens,
with the Mytileneans intending to unite the island under their control. After initial
hesitation, the Spartans and Peloponnesian League eventually lent their support
to the Lesbians; however, the Mytileneans were unable to withstand the Athenian
blockade of their city and in the summer of 427 they surrendered. Like the revolt of
the Aedui, the Mytilenean revolt was particularly insulting in light of the recent
history of cooperation between the Athenians and Mytileneans. The Mytileneans
had been Athenian allies since the Persian Wars. In 440 BCE, Mytilene supplied
a generous contingent of ships to Athens to aid in the suppression of the Samian
Revolt (Thuc. 1.117.2). By the 430s, however, the cooperation between Athens
and Mytilene was increasingly strained as the Mytileneans watched Athens's
other allies "become enslaved" (oi suµµaxo1 eoovAw0ricmv, 3.10.5); the revolt
was not completely unexpected, perhaps, but it clearly signaled the increasing
fragility of the allegiance of Athens's nominal allies. Indeed, as did Caesar in the
case of the Aedui, the Athenians took note of the fact that it was an especially
favored ally who had revolted (emKaAovvTE) TTJV TE a:AAriv 6:nooTaow 0T1 ovK
apx6µEvo1 &:lamp oi 8:J-..J-..01 eno1fioavTo,)" with [some] pointing out that they
[the Mytileneans] revolted although, unlike the others, they were not being ruled
over," 3.36.2).
In the broad outlines, then, the Aeduan and Mytilenean revolts were
similar: each state was a long-standing (if disgruntled) ally, and each state took
advantage of the wartime context (the campaign of Vercingetorix, the invasion
of Attica) to rebel against a distracted and vulnerable entity. One of the main
challenges in the study of allusion and intertextuality in historiography is the
need to distinguish between intentional reference and historical coincidence. Is
the author citing an earlier text, or did the two events described simply happen to
happen in the same way? In the present example, parallels between the account
of the Aeduan revolt in the BG and Thucydides's account of the Mytilenean revolt
suggest that Caesar indeed intentionally evokes major themes of the Thucydidean
narrative in his own account.
We see, for example, similarities in the rebelling cities' self-justification, as
attributed to them by Thucydides and Caesar. Their arguments are similar both
in general argumentation and in specific claims. In terms of the overall rhetorical
approach, C. W. Macleod and Simon Hornblower observed that the Mytileneans
use a combination of moral and prudential arguments. 26 The Mytilenean envoys
first explain to the Spartans their moral justification for revolting (3.9-12, discussed
below in more detail). Turning to arguments of expediency, the Mytileneans then
assert that action must be taken now, while Athens is struggling to recover from
their losses in the war and the plague. They also outline the strategic advantages
to be gained by the Spartans should they aid the Mytileneans' cause (3.13).
Caesar's Aedui also justify their revolt in terms of both of justice and necessity.
Not only do the Aedui and the Gauls in general have the right to freedom and
autonomy, they claim, but this is the time to act; the choice facing the Aedui is
26

Macleod 1978 and Hornblower 1997, 391-398.
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rebellion against the Romans or slaughter at their hands, and they should take
advantage of the distraction caused by Vercingetorix's revolt (BG 7.37-38).
Several specific points of the arguments are similar, as well. According to
Thucydides, the Mytileneans seek to unite the entire island under their own power (3.2.3). 27
Caesar's Aeudui also try to assume command of the rebelling forces once they
join the revolt, perhaps with an eye to a future in which all Gaul is united under
their sovereignty; they sulk publicly when Vercingetorix, one of the Arverni, is
confirmed as sole commander of the rebels (BG 7.63.4-8). As was noted above,
both the Aedui and Mytileneans had been the recipients of particular favor
from Caesar and Athens, respectively. Thucydides's rebels admit as much
in their speech to the Spartans (3.10.5). Like Thucydides, Caesar also puts a
concession of ingratitude in the mouth of a character (in oratio obliqua in this case);
Convictolitavis, attempting to draw the Aedui to the side of Vercingetorix, admits
that he had received particular attention from Caesar (BG 7.37.4).
Whatever favor Caesar's Aedui and Thucydides's Mytileneans received
before, it is clear that each is convinced that the situation has changed. They
both claim that, although they are nominally allies, they are increasingly being
treated as subject states by Rome and Athens, respectively. The Mytileneans
make this claim in an entreaty to the Spartans for support in their rebellion, while
Convictolitavis makes a similar argument to his fellow Aedui and rallies them to
revolt. The Mytileneans tell the Spartans that the other allies of Athens have been
enslaved, and that they fear they will be subjected to the same treatment (3.10.56). Convictolitavis balks at the prospect of continuing to be treated as a Roman
subject: why must the Aedui appeal to Caesar and the Romans for arbitration?
Why not the other way around (BG 7.37.5)?
The parallels accumulate as the Mytileneans and Aedui reflect on their
own positions in the broader political and military context; both conclude that
victory in the larger conflict is contingent on the success of their respective
rebellions, and represent their own states as the final boundary between freedom
and slavery. The Mytileneans entreat the Spartans to receive them as allies by
pointing on the strategic advantage they can offer in the war against Athens. If
the Spartans support them, they will gain the Mytilenean navy; perhaps more
importantly, they will encourage the rest of the Athenian allies to defect (3.13.7).
Caesar's Convictolitavis makes a similar case to the Aeduan youths. The Aedui are
the only obstacle to Gallic victory, he argues. If the Aedui revolt from the Romans,
the rest of the Gauls will follow, bound by no example of loyalty (BG 7.37.3).

It is worth noting that this is a recurring theme in the BG; Caesar often justifies
his suppression of disturbances by citing the need to prevent others from
following the example and staging their own revolt (e.g., the repression of the
Belgae in Book 2, the Eburones in Book 5). A reader of the BG might here recall
not only this argument by Thucydides's Mytilenean embassy, but also Cleon's
argument that the Mytileneans must be destroyed in order to dissuade others
27
l;vvo1K[{;ovm TE TT]V /\fo[3ov es TT]V MvTt/1.rJVTJ [3[q:, "They were forcibly uniting Lesbos
around Mytilene," 3.2.3. As Hornblower 1997 observes (ad lac.), this refers to political synoikism.
It is unclear from Caesar's narrative whether the Aedui imagined this sort of political power
for themselves, but the idea of the Gallic tribes becoming more organized might have been a
disturbing one, since their internal divisions usually discouraged wide-scale rebellion and often
forced the tribes to rely on Caesar for adjudication (e.g., the Aeduan election conflict in Book 7).
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from rebelling (3.37-40, discussed in more detail below). Caesar thus sows
Thucydidean seeds in his reader's imagination and evokes that Thucydidean
"resonance" well before the revolt of the Aedui in Book 7, all without a direct or
linguistic allusion.
The historical circumstances of the revolts were thus similar, and Caesar
intensifies the similarities by crafting his Aeduans' self-justification to echo that
of the Mytileneans. The rhetoric of Caesar's Aedui recalls that of Thucydides's
Mytileneans: once-favored allies suspect that they are becoming subject states,
not allies, and so they align themselves with a larger force to whom they can
offer a strategic advantage. Reporting to a Roman audience about private
deliberations among the Gallic tribes, Caesar was free to frame the arguments of
the Aedui in whatever way would best suit his own rhetorical purposes. Why
invoke the context of Thucydides and the Mytileneans? The Mytilenean debate
exemplifies the Thucydidean conflict (articulated by Felling) between expediency
and angry miscalculation. By setting this context in the background of his own
narrative, Caesar portrays himself as a commander in a more positive light than
the bare narrative would have. 28
Caesar could simply tell us that he is an effective leadehr, but this
would have little impact.29 It would be more convincing for Caesar to show us
through his narrative that he is effective, and he does so in the commentaries by
highlighting his successes and reframing his setbacks.30 Caesar's strategy in
the Aeduan narrative is more effective yet. Caesar the author uses the allusion
to Thucydides to shape his portrayal of Caesar the commander by implicitly
contrasting the efficient, successful way in which he deals with a crisis with
the near-disaster of the Athenians. More specifically, Caesar is not concerned
with avenging past wrongs, but rather with expediency; he sees that dementia
at present can provide security in the future. 31 Caesar's effectiveness is thrown
into stark relief when it is implicitly compared to the Athenians' clumsy handling
of the Mytilenean revolt. By evoking the Mytilenean episode, in which the
Athenians are nearly persuaded to annihilate an entire population out of rage,
Caesar demonstrates the danger of letting immediate concerns (satisfying one's
anger) outweigh long-term interests (preventing widespread insurrection).
Ibe jmmediate thirst for revenge is quenched, but then what? Caesar's own
28
It is well-acknowledged that Caesar qua author is acutely concerned with constructing
the image of Caesar qua commander, but, as Adrian Goldsworthy has remarked, "[t]he ways in
which Caesar creates this impression, and the specific qualities of his skills as a commander that
he emphasizes, have not really been analyzed." (Goldsworthy 1998, 194). Grillo 2011 addresses
Caesar's self-presentation in the BC, a text in which much was at stake for Caesar in terms of
public perception. However, past scholarship on this topic (especially scholarship on the BG)
has tended to focus on the more technical aspects and content of Caesar's self-presentation
rather than his literary techniques. See, for example, Fuller 1965 and Campbell 1987.
29
In his letter to Lucceius, Cicero claims that one of the reasons he wished to avoid the
weighty responsibility of writing about his own consulship was the skepticism with which
audiences approach autobiographical narratives (ad Fam. 5.12.9).
30
On Caesar's use of this literary technique in general, see Raumbaud 1966.
31
There is a wide-ranging body of scholarship on Caesar's dementia. Coulter 1931 provides a
fairly comprehensive overview of references to Caesar's clemency in the commentaries and Cicero's
letters. More recently, see Barlow 1998, Powell 2003, Riggsby 2006 (especially 175-189), and Grillo
2012 (especially 78-105). Konstan 2005 challenges the idea that the dementia Caesaris wa~ universally
recognized by Caesar's contemporaries as a manifestation of tyrannical ambitions.
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handling of rebellious subjects seems all the more expedient by comparison. It
may feel unsatisfactory at present to not slaughter the Aedui, but preserving the
repressed rebels rather than slaughtering them will benefit Caesar in the future;
the spared will be bound in Caesar's debt and thus more easily controlled.
Caesar employs this method of contrast-by-allusion elsewhere to great
effect; for example, Christopher Krebs has convincingly demonstrated Caesar's
use of a similar technique in his depiction of the geography of Germany. Caesar,
Krebs argues, positions his Germans and Germania in such a way as to call to
mind Herodotus's Scythians and Scythia: a nomadic, slippery people inhabiting
a trackless, unexplored space. Caesar the commander, then, is shown by
comparison to surpass Darius. Whereas Darius unwisely tries to match the
Scythians at their own nomadic game and his campaign ends in disaster and
defeat, Caesar withdraws from his pursuit of the German tribes before incurring
significant losses; Caesar's failure to swiftly conquer the territory beyond the
Rhine is thus reframed as a canny and circumspect tactical choice.32
In the present case, however, it is not Herodotus's world against which Caesar
sets his own, but Thucydides's. The Mytilenean debate has been discussed extensively
in modem scholarship and the general circumstances of the revolt are familiar. 33
Upon receiving word of Paches' s victory in Lesbos, the Athenians immediately
voted in anger (VTTo 6pyiis, 3.36.2) to put to death the entire adult male population of
Mytilene and to enslave the women and children; messengers were sent that day to
deliver these orders to Paches. The next day brought with it second thoughts (Kal TiJ
VOTEpaiq: µET6:vo16: TIS ev8vs riv aVTOlS Kal ava11.oy1oµos wµov TO {3ov/\.Evµa Kal µeya
eyvwovai, n611.1v 011.riv 01acpve1pa1 µ6:11.11.ov fl ov Tovs aiTiovs, "The next day, there was
a change of heart, and reflection that it was a savage decree that had been passed, to
destroy the entire city rather than the guilty parties alone," 3.36.4),34 and an assembly
was convened to revisit the matter. Cleon, who on the previous day had proposed
the successful motion to put the Mytileneans to death, made the first speech. He
argued that the Mytileneans should be thoroughly destroyed as an example for any
other wavering allies; their previous favored status was all the more reason for a swift
and devastating punishment (3.37-40). Cleon is opposed by one Diodotus, otherwise
unknown. Diodotus responds that the decision should be made in the interest of
expediency, not revenge; it might satisfy the Athenians' present rage to annihilate the
Mytileneans, but it will not deter anyone in the future from revolting, and preserving
the defeated insurgents will allow the Athenians to maintain the favor of the people
in the tribute-paying states (3.42-48). A second vote was taken and the motion of
Diodotus won by a narrow margin; the message barely reached Paches in time, and
the Mytileneans were ultimately spared (3.49).
In the Mytilenean debate, the savage (wµ6v) opinion loses out, but just
barely. The Athenians, an emotional mob, have come perilously close to committing
an atrocity for the sake of immediate revenge. It takes the Athenians two rounds
of debate to decide to spare the Mytileneans. Caesar, on the other hand, handles
32
Krebs 2006.
33
Recent studies include Fulkerson 2008 on the balance of reason and emotion in the
appeals of Cleon and Diodotus and Debnar 2000 on Diodotus's paradoxical representation of
Athenian political discourse.
34
Hornblower 1997 notes (ad lac.) that wµoc; and 6pyri are often linked; this connection
between high emotion (6pyri) and disastrous result (wµ6c;) is Caesar's point, as well.
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the Aedui with two words: civitatem recipit ("He took back the city," BG 7.90.1). The
Aedui are preserved as allies and order is restored in Gaul. Thucydides presents two
speeches at the moment of decision; Caesar includes none. He simply tells us that
he took back the city. If, indeed, Caesar intended to evoke Thucydides's account
of the Mytilenean revolt, why would he avoid any allusion to that iconic exchange,
the Mytilenean debate? Some kind of debate would have made the allusion more
explicit. Although it is obviously unlikely that Caesar would have put the decision
to a vote, he could have narrated an internal debate: "Caesar considered his options:
whether to punish the treachery of the Aedui with death, or to spare them in the
spirit of clementia." 35 Caesar, does not, however, compose anything resembling an
"Aeduan debate," even an internal one. To do so would undermine the intent of the
allusion (that is, to demonstrate by contrast Caesar's effectiveness as a commander) by
suggesting a moment of indecision.
The solution may be to look for the "other half" of the debate elsewhere in
the Aeduan narrative. I suggest that this may be the function of the speech of the
Arvernian leader Critognatus to the besieged at Alesia. Critognatus's speech stands in
for the other side of the debate; Critognatus, with his barbaric and cruel advice, plays
the role of Cleon and represents the wµ6v. 36 Oratio recta is relatively rare in the BG,37
but Caesar gives Critognatus, making his only appearance in the narrative, an extensive
direct speech. Indeed, Caesar tells us that the speech of the Arvernian leader on
account of its singular and wicked cruelty- is not to be passed over (non praetereunda
oratio Critognati videtur propter eius singularem et nefariam crudelitatem, BG 7.77.2).38
Caesar then reports Critognatus' s words in direct discourse. In this speech, Critognatus
urges those trapped inside Alesia to resort to extreme measures to survive the siege:
they should do what their ancestors did, and nourish themselves on the bodies of those
who are physically unfit for military service.
It is obvious that Caesar's choice was not between sparing the Aedui and
eating them. Critognatus's advice, however, does represent the short-sighted and
extreme measures by those who are desperate and thinking only of their immediate
concerns (measures which also include, for example, slaughtering entire cities of allies).
These are the kinds of measures Caesar rejects in the case of the Aedui. Critognatus's
response, like Cleon's, arises from overflowing emotion (desperation in the case of
Critognatus, rage in the case of Cleon). Just as Cleon's recommendation to destroy
the Mytileneans would do much to satisfy his passion but little to bring the Athenian
allies back under control, Critognatus's proposal would have only temporarily solved
35
Although he avoids it in the Aedui episode, Caesar does describe his internal debate
on other occasions: Caesar debates with himself how best to punish the rebelling Eburones (BG
6.34) and how to take Corfinium as quickly as possibly without his soldiers plundering the
town (BC 1.21).
36
Scholars have generally focused on the formal oratorical structures, features, and
figures of the speech (e.g., Rasmussen 1963, Schieffer 1972, Batstone 1990, Riggsby 2006).
37
The BG contains nine speeches in direct discourse, concentrated in the later books (no
one speaks in OR until the anonymous aquilifer in Book Four); the BC, on the other hand, has
ten utterances in OR. Rasmussen 1963.
38
To add to the verbal and thematic parallels described above: Caesar's editorializing
here recalls Thucydides' characterization of Cleon as being a "most violent man" (!31at6tmo~
3.36.6). Caesar also describes Critognatus as a "man of great influence (magnae habitus auctoritatis, 7.77.3)"; similarly, Thucydides notes that Cleon was, at that time, the man "most able to
influence the demos" (Tc';) n OT]l-le+> TTapa TTOA\J EV Tc';) T6TE mvavwTaTOS', 3.36.6).
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the plight of the besieged Gauls: they would have a few more days of rations and then
what?
Caesar's Roman audience might have felt the same outrage at the betrayal of
the Aedui as Cleon did at the betrayal of the Mytileneans; from a Roman perspective,
Caesar would have been entirely justified in sacking the Aeduan territory and killing
or enslaving the population.39 Instead, Caesar follows the sort of course advocated
by Diodotus in his speech opposing Cleon. Diodotus argues that, rather than
merely satisfying their passions, the Athenians must do what is in the best
interest of the city; the decision must be made with an eye to the future, not the
present.
"flV TE yap c:mocprivw Tiav0' CXOIKOVVTOS O\JTOVS, OU 010 TOVTO
KOi CXTIOKTEIVOI KE/1.EVOW, El µ17 i;vµcpepov, Tl TE KOi EXOVTOS Tl
i;vyywµris tETEvt, El Tij TIO/I.El µ17 ayo06v cpo[VOITO (3.44.2-3)

If I assert that they are all guilty, I will not therefore recommend that
we put them to death for this, unless it is expedient, unless they have
some case for pardon, unless it seems beneficial to the polis.
TOCE yap ES TE TO µE/1./1.0V ayo0a KOi TOIS TIO/I.Eµ[o1s "flOT] cpo[3Epa·
OOTIS yap EV [3ov/l.EVET01 Tipos TOVS EVOVTIOVS KpE[oowv EOTIV fl
µET' epywv 1oxvos avo[c;c ETIIWV (3.48.2)

These things are both beneficial [to us] in the future and frightening to
our enemies at present; for whoever strategizes well against enemies is
stronger than the one attacking blindly with brute force. 40
This is consistent with the approach Caesar takes apropos of the troublemakers
who surrender throughout the Bellum Gallicum. To be sure, as scholars have
observed, Caesar's contemporaries suspected that Caesar's dementia was not
extended for free. 41 Cicero recounts to Atticus the report of Curio, who has told
Cicero that Caesar has only refrained from executing the tribune Metellus (and
probably others) due to his concern for his public image:
ipsum autem non voluntate aut natura non esse crudelem, sed quad
putaret popularem esse clementiam. Quad si populi studium amisissit,
39
Indeed, he is not opposed to doing so under certain circumstances; he enslaves the
population of the Atuatuci for participating in the uprising of the Belgae in 57 BCE. Why does
Caesar so harshly punish the Atuatuci, a minor Belgic tribe? The Atuatuci had originally
surrendered to Caesar under terms similar to those of the surrender of the Nervii in the same
revolt; they must yield up their arms, but Caesar will protect them against incursions by their
neighbors. During the night, however, the Atuatuci attacked the Romans with weapons they
had kept concealed. The Romans subdued them and Caesar's response was merciless; dementia could not be extended to those who could not be trusted.
40
As Hornblower 1997 notes (ad Zoe.), Diodotus's KpEicrcrrov here alludes back to Cleon
at 3.37.3 (xEipom v6µ01s O:KIV~TOIS xpwµEVT] TIOAIS KpEiaawv ECTTIV ~ KaAws EXOVCTIV a:Kupo1s, "a
city in which the laws are worse but firm is stronger than one in which the laws are excellent
but without force").
41
Dowling 2006 neatly summarizes the remarks to this effect in Cicero's letters.
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crudelem fore (Att. 10.4.8)
[Curio said that] Caesar himself was neither by inclination nor nature
unwilling to be cruel, but he thought that clemency would be popular;
if he lost the affection of the people, though, he would be cruel. 42
One way in which clemency was useful to Caesar, then, was that it appealed to the
people. Furthermore, as Hirtius points out in BG 8.49 (quoted below), those who have
been spared are indebted and thus easier to control and exploit. In Book 2, Caesar
remarks that he desired to "preserve the safety" of the surrendering Nervii and
exercise clementia toward them. He imposes no terms on them other than that they
should keep to their own territories and warns their neighbors to do the same.
quos Caesar, ut in miseros ac supplices usus misericordia videretur,
diligentissime conservavit suisque finibus atque oppidis uti iussit et
finitimis imperavit ut ab iniuria et maleficio se suosque prohiberent
(BG 2.28)
Caesar, in order that he might be recognized as demonstrating pity
toward wretched, suppliant men, spared them [the Nervii] most
responsibly, and ordered that they benefit only from their own lands
and downs, and ordered that their neighbors check themselves and
their allies from causing injury or harm to them.
Although Caesar's stated motive for sparing the Nervii is that he wishes to be
known for his humane treatment of the wretched (ut in miseros ac supplices usus
misericordia videretur), by preserving the Nervii, he is binding them to himself
and to Rome as clients. Caesar's clemency is always practical, never a gesture of
mere goodwill. Caesar's clementia is highlighted again in Book 8, as he looks to
solidify Gaul's loyalty before the end of his proconsulate. Hirtius tells us that no
new burdens were imposed on the Gauls, but that Caesar addressed the states
with respect and gave rewards to their leaders:
Nihil enim minus volebat quam sub decessu suo necessitatem sibi
aliquam imponi belli gerendi, ne, cum exercitum deducturus esset,
bellum aliquod relinqueretur quod omnis Gallia libenter sine praesenti
periculo susciperet. Itaque honorifice civitates appellando, prindpes
maximis praemiis adficiendo, nulla onera iniungendo defessam tot
adversis proeliis Galliam condicione parendi meliore facile in pace
continuit. (BG 8.49)
There was nothing he desired less than that, upon his departure, the
need of waging another war be imposed upon him, lest, when he was
going to lead away his army, another war remain, which Gaul would
willingly undertake, since there was no present danger. For this
reason, by addressing the states with respect, by influencing the

-----42
See also Caesar's own remarks on his dementia at Att. 9.16, and Cicero's tart reference
to insidiosa dementia at Att. 8.16.2.
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leading men with great gifts, by imposing no burdens, and by making
the condition of their subjection less severe, he easily kept Gaul,
drained by so many lost battles, quiet.
In particular, he does not inflict punishment on the Bellovaci, despite their
participation in the revolt; the damage they have inflicted upon themselves, he says,
is punishment enough (Sed tamen se contentum fore ea poena quam sibi ipsi contraxissent,
"But [he said that] he would be content with the punishment which they had brought
upon themselves," BG 8.22.2). As in the case of the Nervii, he spares the Bellovaci and
the others not out of kindness, but to put them under obligation to him and, hopefully,
leave them disinclined to revolt again.
Caesar's treatment of the Aedui follows the same reasoning and recalls the
advice of Diodotus: spare them now rather than annihilate them and secure their
loyalty and obligation for the future. In this respect, then, the Aeduan example
is somewhat unexceptional. What is exceptional, however, is the literary method
of Caesar's presentation of his own dementia. Not only does he demonstrate his
expedient use of clemency as he does elsewhere in the BG, by using the speech
of Critognatus to evoke the memory of Cleon and the near-destruction of the
Mytileneans, he reminds us how dangerous the alternative could be. The Athenians
restrained themselves from inflicting mass destruction in the case of the Mytileneans,
but only barely. As Caesar's reader would surely recall, however, the Athenians
finally capitulated to their savage instincts in the case of Melos thirteen years
later. In Thucydides's account, the brutal oppression of the Melians, set as if on the
eve of the disastrous Sicilian expedition, seems to represent a turning point. The
Athenians' fortunes rapidly deteriorated thereafter, and it is not unreasonable to see in
Thucydides's version the implication of causality: the hubris in Melos led to the hubris
in Sicily, which reversed the momentum of the war in favor of the Spartans.43
The Romans need not fear such a disaster, Caesar seems to suggest; the Athenians
wavered at Mytilene, and committed an atrocity at Melos, but Caesar would never
risk Roman security in order to satisfy his own selfish passion for revenge.
In summary: I have here attempted to demonstrate the way in which Caesar
employs Thucydidean allusions to shape his portrayal of himself as a successful
commander. Through echoes of language and argument, Caesar exploits the
similarities between the revolts of the Aedui and Mytileneans to recall Thucydides's
narrative. Caesar advocates a position of clemency for the sake of expediency; by
looking out for future interests rather than satisfying immediate desires, he avoids the
catastrophe toward which the Athenians seemed aimed at Mytilene, and with which
they ultimately collided at Melos. The allusion portrays Caesar qua commander in an
even better light than merely mentioning his dementia, as he does elsewhere in the BG,
because it reminds his audience how disastrous the opposite can be.
43
As Thucydides ob~erves in his digression on stasis in the context of the Mytilenean revolt, war's negative effects on character are compounded as it progresses (ev µl:v yap
EipT]VlJ Kai o:ya0ois npo:µamv at TE TIOAEIS Kal o\ IOIWTat aµeivovs TO:$ yvwµas exovm Ola TO
µ11 ES O:KOVcriovs avayKas TiiTITEIV· 6 OE TIOAEµos V(JlEAWV TTJV Ell1TOpiav TOV Ka0' rJµEpav [3[aios
016aoKaAOS Kai npos Ta nap6VTa TO:$ 6pyas TWV TIOAAWV 6µ0101, "In peace and fortunate
times, cities and men have better sentiments, because they do not fall into unwelcome need.
But war, that violent teacher, takes away the easy supply of daily necessity and matches men's
characters to their circumstances," (3.82.2).
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